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NOTES AND COMMENTS
CRIMINAL LAW
VICARIOUS CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILrKTY
The Buffalo Pharmacal Company, Inc., and Joseph H. Dotter-
weich, its president and general manager, were chargad with deliver-
ing misbranded and adultered drugs in interstate commerce in violation
of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetics Act.' Evidence was ade-
quate to support the finding of misbranding and adulteration, but
there was a total lack of evidence of conscious fraud, personal par-
ticipation, or acquiescence in the illegal act by the defendant Dotter-
weich. Held, that the question of Dotterweich's responsibility was
properly left to the jury. Dotterweich was found guilty; the corpor-
ation was acquitted. The conviction against Dotte:,.weich was re-
versed by the Circuit Court of Appeals (131 F. 2d 500), and this
judgment was reversed by a five-four decision of the Supreme Court.
United States v. Dotterweich, 64 Sup. Ct. 134 (1943). (Justices Mur-
phy, Roberts, Reed, and Rutledge dissenting).
Upon first analysis the doctrine of this case seem3 to be violative
of the basic principle that " . . . to constitute cAime . . . there
must be first a vicious will. .... -2 This fundamental canon of
Anglo-American jurisprudence,3 until comparatively recent times,
branded as odious and intolerable any notion of viamrious criminal
liability.4 But, during the last century, along with the great industrial
upheaval and consequent increase in congested areas, the legislatures
have enacted many regulatory statutes creating "Public Welfare
Offenses," the mass enforcement of which has dispensed with the
classical requirement of "mens rea."6 Thus the modern rule would
1. 52 Stat. 1059 (1938), 21 U.S.C.A. § 1 et seq. (Supp. 1943).
2. 4 Bl. Comm.* 21.
3. See May, "Law of Crimes" (4th ed. 1938) 21; Miller, "Criminal
Law" (1943) 52; 14 Am. Jur. (Criminal Law) ii 29.
4. Baron Parke, in the case of Regina v. Woodrov, 15 M. & W.
404, 153 Eng. Rep.R. 907 (Ex. 1846), wrote cne of the first
opinions emphasizing this new development. Sortie of the earlier
cases rationalized the departure from the "mers rea" require-
ment upon the ground that although the proceeding was criminal
in form it was civil in nature, hence "mens rea" - as not essential.
Regina v. Stephens, 1 Q. B. 702, 707 (1866). See Barnes v.
State, 19 Conn. 398 (1849), for one of the first American decisions
in line with this new development.
5. See Sayre, "Public Welfare Offenses" (1933) 33 Col. L. Rev. 55.
6. Id. at 69, where Professor Sayre says: "It is r eedless to point
out that, swamped with such appalling inundations of cases of
petty violations, the lower criminal courts would be physically
unable to examine the subjective intent of each defendant, even
were such determination desirable." See T-nerient House De-
partmetit of City of New York v. McDevit, .5 N. Y. 160, 168,
109 N. E. 88 (1915); People ex rel. Price v. 0heffield Farms-
Slawson-Decker Company, 225 N. Y. 25, 121 N. E. 474 (1918).
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seem to be that "mens rea" is a necessary ingredient of criminal of-
fenses unless a statute either expressly or by necessary implication dis-
penses with it.7 The extent that we may go in prudently eliminating
the "intent" element is indeed a moot question.8
Modern tribunals are no longer troubled with the apparent anti-
nomy of corporate criminality.9 Further, as there are many cases
where individuals are held criminally guilty with culpabilityo (e.g. traf-
fic violators), so there are many instances where culpability is not a
condition precedent to corporate criminality." This apparent harsh-
ness is rationalized on the grounds of public expediency.12 The pure
food laws afford an example.
The obvious objective of the pure food laws is to protect the public
against the fraud and imposition of manufacturers and vendors of
inferior and unwholesome food and medicinal products. 13 Noting the
probable difficulty of proof of the normal requirement of criminal
intent, the legislators have deemed it expedient to uproot this prere-
quisite14 and have formulated an "at peril" dogma. Thus even the
7. See 22 C. J. S. (Criminal Law) §§ 29, 30.
8. See Ballantine, "Manual of Corporation Law and Practice" (1930)
311, 312; Hall, "Prolegomena to a Science of Criminal Law"
(1941) 89 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 563-569; Hall, "Interrelations of
Criminal Law and Torts: II" (1943) 43 Col. L. Rev. 986-996;
Sayre, "Public Welfare Offenses" (1933) 33 Col. L. Rev. 55.
9. See New York Central and Hudson River R. R. v. United States,
212 U.S. 481 (1908); United States v. Nearing et al., 252 Fed.
223, 231 (S. D. N. Y. 1918); United States v. American Socialist
Soc. et al., 260 Fed. 885 (S. D. N. Y. 1919). See also Edgerton,
"Corporate Criminal Responsibility" (1927) 36 Yale L. J. 827.
10. See note 6 supra.
11. The doctrine of respondeat superior, rendering the principal re-
sponsible for the acts of its servant, is applicable to criminal
as well as tort actions. In such cases the corporation is liable,
notwithstanding the lack of culpability. See note 16 infra. Wil-
liam Draper Lewis, Director of the American Law Institute,
said, "The rule is this: One who has ownership in or control of a
business is personally liable, unless that liability is limited by
statute, for acts done in the course of and for the business."
Lewis, "The Liability of the Undisclosed Principal in Contract"
(1909) 9 Col. L. Rev. 116, 128.
12. In the instant case at 136, Mr. Justice Frankfurter said, "The
purposes of this legislation thus touch phases of the lives and
health of people which, in the circumstances of modern industrial-
ism, are largely beyond self protection." Id. at 138 he said,
"Balancing relative hardships, Congress has preferred to place
it upon those who have at least the opportunity of informing
themselves of-the existence of conditions imposed for the pro-
tection of consumers before sharing in illicit commerce, rather
than to throw the hazard on the innocent public who are wholly
helpless." See also 22 C. J. S. (Criminal Law) § 30.
13. See Groff v. State, 171 Ind. 547, 548, 85 N. E. 769 (1908).
14. Much importance was attached to this point in the celebrated
case of Hobs v. Winchester Corporation, 2 K. B. 471, 480, 484
(1910). But see Hall, "Prolegomena to a Science of Criminal
Law" (1941) 89 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 549, 568, where it is said, "But
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exercise of the highest degree of care will not absolve liability.15
There is ample authority for the proposition that a corporation is
criminally liable for the acts of its agents if the act3 are committed
within the scope of the agents' employment. 1 Also, it seems to be the
accepted opinion of the authorities that the personal criminality of
corporate officers includes an element of 'mens rea" or at least
acquiescence. 17 In the instant case it will be noted that the corpora-
tion was acquitted, but the corporate officer was convicted. It is
conceded that the legislature intended, even in the complete absence
of guilty knowledge, that violations of the act should not go unpunished.
That the legislature intended that an individual should bear the penalty
merely because he was the managing director of the corporation and
the superior officer of the unknown person who was, in fact, the
violator is not so readily conceded.18 Here the decision would tend
to make corporate officers vicariously liable for all the acts of their
subordinates.' 9 If this had been the legislative intent they should
have stipulated it "plainly and unmistakably." 20
Inasnmuch as the record is devoid of evidence of even negligence on
the part of the corporate officer, this decision appears to depart
it is apparent that the problems of proof, cas,3 by case, offer
no greater difficulties than in most felonies, and much less than
in some, e.g., receiving stolen property."
15. See Groff v. State, 171 Ind. 547, 85 N. E. 769 (1908); People v.
Dennis, 114 N.Y. Supp. 7 (1909); People v. Tstsera, 138 App.
Div. 446, 122 N. Y. Supp. 915 (1910); Hobbs v. Winchester Cor-
poration, 2 K. B. 471 (1910).
16. There are many statutory declarations to this effect. The Federal
Food and Drug Act, 52 Stat. 1059 (1938), 21 U.S.C.A. § 331 (Supp.
1943); The Grain Standards Act, 39 Stat. 482 (1916), 7 U.S.C.A.
§ 73. See Edgerton, "Corporate Criminal Responsibility" (1927)
36 Yale L. J. 827, where it is said, "A corporation should be
considered capable of any crime, and guilty of any crime if the
human persons who commit the crime act in the course of their
employment so as to make the corporation responsible in tort."
But see Ballantine, "Manual of Corporation Law and Practice"
(1930) 310; Stevens, "Handbook on the Law of Private Corpora-
tions" (1936) §§ 80, 81.
17. See State v. Guthrie, 176 Ark. 1041, 5 S. W. (2d) 306 (1928);
State v. German, 161 Ore. 442, 90 P. (2d) 306 (1938); State v.
Thoman, 123 Wash. 299, 212 Pac. 253, 255 (1923). See also
Thompson, "Corporations" (3rd ed. 1927) § 5633; 13 Am. Jur.
(Corporations) § 1100.
18. See Sayre, "Public Welfare Offenses" (1933) 33 Col. L. Rev.
55, 79, where the author says, "When the law begins to permit
convictions for serious offenses of men who are morally innocent
and free from fault, who may even be respected and useful
members of the community, its restraining power becomes under-
mined. Once it becomes respectable to be convicted the vitality
of the criminal law has been sapped."
19. Se? Per.ple v. Brainard et al., 192 App. Div. 816, 183 N. Y. Supp.
452 (lt Dep't 1920).
20. See Urited States v. Lacher, 134 U. S. 624, 623 (1889); United
State -. Gradwell et al., 243 U. S. 476, 485 (1916); People v.
Brainard et al., 192 App. Div. 816, 183 N.Y. Supp. 452 (1st Dep't
1920). See also 14 Am. Jur. (Criminal Law § 24.
19441 267
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wholly from the principle that guilt is personal and ought not be
lightly imputed.21 In the public interest of insuring prudence in the
conduct of the business of the Buffalo Pharmacal Co., a majority
of the Justices deemed it wise to place a criminal stigma on the
defendant; a stigma that is predicated wholly upon chance, for it
necessarily follows that in the absence of fraud, participation, acquies-
cense, or even negligence, the act of adulteration and misbranding was
not within Dotterweich's power of human control.22 It is submitted
that the public interest could be as adequately protected, without a
serious departure from established criminal law doctrines, by placing
a presumption of guilt and a burden of proof upon the corporate
officer.
CONFLICT OF LAWS
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION AWARD HELD RES JUDICATA
AS TO SECOND RECOVERY IN ANOTHER STATE.
Respondent resided, and was hired, in Louisiana as a laborer on
a Texas oil well owned by the petitioner. In the course of this em-
ployment, Hunt was injured; he received a compensation award under
the Texas Workmen's Compensation Act.' By the terms of the Texas
Act this award became final.2 Respondent later3 brought an action
under the Louisiana Workmen's Compensation Act4 to recover for
his injury; petitioner's exception was overruled and judgment was
rendered for Hunt less the amount of the Texas payments. The
Louisiana Appellate Court affirmed this decision,5 with the Louisiana
Supreme Court refusing to review. On writ of certiorari, held, re-
versed. A compensation award of one state which has become final is
21. See instant case at 139.
22. See Hall, "Prolegomena to a Science of Criminal Law" (1941)
89 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 549, 568, and Hall, "Interrelations of Crim-
inal Law and Torts: II" (1943) 43 Col. L. Rev. 986-996.
1. Texas Statutes (Vernon, 1936) art. 8306 through 8309.
2. Texas Statutes (Vernon, 1936) art. 8307, § 5, which states in
substance that a party, dissatisfied with the award of the In-
dustrial Accident Board, may review the award by giving notice
within twenty days that he will not conform to it and within
twenty days after giving such notice, he must bring suit in thd
proper court. If no notice is given or no suit is brought within
the limited time, the award of the Board shall be final and binding.
3. Hunt brought the Louisiana suit on December 18, 1940. His
accident occurred on May 25, 1939, payments for which began on
June 9, 1939 by petitioner's insurer; the payments continued until
October 26, 1940 or thereabouts when Hunt's attorneys informed
respondent that they were going to bring the Louisiana suit.
Disregarding adequate notice of the Texas board's hearing, Hunt
did not attend, and on December 3, 1940 a decision was made
from which Hunt did not appeal.
4. La. Gen. Stat. Ann. (Dart, 1939) §§ 4391 through 4434.
5. Hunt v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., - La. App. - , 10 So. (2d)
109 (1942).
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